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1. Introduction
The Natural Selection Principle plays an important role in Darwinian evolution theory for
the world of biology; its success and reasoning power have persuaded many people that there
should be a similar principle for social, economic phenomena. After all, the current economy is
a much faster evolutionary process. Unlike in the history of evolution where species appeared
to be relatively stable-Darwin had to marshal much evidence to make his case-little need to ar-
gue that products, consumer tastes, social customs, ﬁrms, and prevailing economic institutions
etc, are all evolving literally before our eyes, sometimes dramatically. What is of much debate
among economists and other scholars is how to describe the economy as an evolutionary process.
Attempts of slavishly mimicking the natural selection approach have been recently criticized by
many. It is becoming clear that the economy, while sharing many similarities with biology, has
many features like intentionality, institutions, etc that are unique for man-made processes. It
seems futile to identify literally what is exactly the gene-like units and the transmission mecha-
nism; it also appears fruitful to use Darwinian thinking to examine economic processes, not just
to take it dogmatically.
I shall examine the link between information and evolution closely below, and propose ’infor-
mational selection’ as a similar but alternative theory to Darwinian natural selection theory. We
shall see that though there are many distinct features unique to economic and cultural processes,
there are also many methodological similarities with natural selection. This paper is an outline
of an ongoing work which more systematically studies the role information plays in economic
evolution. For the limited space here I shall raise some salient points: how can agents in their
economic transactions use limited information capabilities to cope with complex situations; how
can agents’ information capabilities be boosted by technical progresses, especially be empow-
ered by new information institutions; what if such capabilities are indeed boosted and what are
the (evolutionary) consequences. Granting that the economy is an evolutionary process, should
scholars just describe it as an inevitable natural phenomenon or is there something important for
them to do proactively? Institutions regulating economic processes just passively adjust to the
Email address: yi-cheng.zhang@unifr.ch (Yi-Cheng Zhang)
c© 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd
Physics Procedia 3 (2010) 1941–1955
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
1875-3892 c© 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd
doi:10.1016/j.phpro.2010.07.039
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
/ Physics Procedia 00 (2010) 1–15 2
rapidly evolving economy or can sometimes anticipate and facilitate it? We shall see that such an
endeavor raises both fundamental questions as well as having practical consequences, and calls
for a multi-disciplinary approach beyond the traditional arena of economics.
2. Imperfect Information
We start out in this section to look into some details why information or knowledge for a
given economic transaction is generally insuﬃcient. Akerlof in ’lemon’s problem’ [1] has shown
that when information asymmetry for a given product is at its extreme, i.e. the buyer has no
idea about the product’s hidden quality, the potentially mutually beneﬁcial transaction may not
happen, hence market failures. However, the asymmetric information problem permeates much
wider economic transactions. Tibor Scitovsky [33] observed that in the modern economy vendors
are ’specialists’ in a given niche, thus invest heavily in knowing all there is to know; buyers on
the other hand must be content to be ’generalists’ since they must spread their limited (cognitive)
resources thin among many diﬀerent niches about daily life. Kenneth Arrow [3] also pointed out
that ’market failure is not absolute; it is better to consider a broader category that of transaction
costs, which in general impede and in particular cases block the formation of markets’. Recently
this writer [39] has incorporated these ideas by introducing a continuous parameter-’information
capability’-to model the region between the two limits: total clairvoyance traditionally assumed
in neoclassical economics and total lack of information in lemon’s problem. In a typical transac-
tion when information is somewhat imperfect, the transaction would still take place but it might
not be optimal for both the vendor and buyer. The new approach permits us to study what if in-
formation capabilities are improved (or worsened) incrementally. Such improvement can happen
both via cognitive and information technological means, and it leads us to ask what are the con-
sequences. Individual consumers do not stand much chance in the ever more complex modern
economy, the globalization tendency can even exacerbate the information asymmetry problem.
However, with the rapid progress in the information technology, especially in the internet, many
entrepreneurs have established ’information institutions’ that pool the individual information ca-
pabilities together. Collectively the buyers can signiﬁcantly improve their individual information
capabilities through sharing and division of labor. As examples of such ’Information Institu-
tions’ we refer to the EBay’s information feedback system on the vendors, Amazon’s collective
book review system, Epinions’ reviews on many products and services, many travel web sites
letting members to rate service providers like hotels and restaurants etc. The list of information
institutions in all kinds of disguises is long and growing by the day. They play a similar role
as the old information institutions such like Better Business Bureau, Consumer Reports etc, but
the Web-enabled information institutions can easily reach millions of consumers, and the impact
of economies of scale can be huge. Many online information institutions are distinct from their
older oﬄine counterparts: information collecting and sharing are done by consumers themselves
and for themselves, with the information institutions acting as enabling matchmakers.
Buyers and vendors can be considered as mutually selecting each other. However, there is
an additional asymmetry between prices and quality attributes. Whereas prices are normally
easy to see, quality attributes are far harder to determine; they require far higher information
capabilities and analysis power. Thus though the two sides select each other, because of the
above asymmetry, we shall be more concerned with consumers selection for vendor’s products.
Both sides have something to oﬀer: buyers with money and vendors with products. However, it
is less a problem to verify buyers’ monies are not fakes and their credit worthiness is acceptable,
than consumers can reliably verify vast diﬀerent kinds of products and services. This additional
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asymmetry, together with the fact vendors being normally ’specialists’ and buyers ’generalists’,
makes the buyers side’s selection power weaker than that for the other side.
Besides, for the consumer sector information necessary for economic organization is also
observed to be very limited. Mark Granovetter [15] and colleagues in their empirical study
of sociological aspects of the ﬁrms and their suppliers, have noted that to cope with imperfect
information, relations among the business partners are often ’embedded’: instead of going to
open markets for what is needed, ﬁrms develop and cultivate complex semi-rigid links between
them. These authors provide much evidence that given imperfect information is so pervasive;
the embeddedness is the best way out. For other economic activities a typical ﬁrm faces similar
imperfect information problems: like hiring talents (signaling problem), evaluating employees’
performance (eﬃcient wage problem), management’s interests not always being aligned with that
of the ﬁrm (agency/principal problem) etc. In fact the modern economy can be viewed as tethered
by information food-chains or food-webs, and these chains or webs are ever more stretched:
between the end users and primary producers there are many nodes of info-intermediaries and
each such node is aﬄicted with imperfect information.
Such a litany of examples can go on without end. It would be an academic exercise to call
information imperfect without oﬀering hope that information capabilities can be improved. This
can be done not because we call on consumers to be more diligent activists, but by carefully
designing information institutions, leveraging the current IT advances, which would enable di-
vision of labor on the global scale. Since information is inherently non-rival, consumers can
boost their information capabilities without overtaxing on individual eﬀort. It is in this sense it
is productive to examine carefully the imperfect information problem across economic activities,
doing so would allow scholars, institution designers, and policy makers to come up with insight
as how best to tap into this vast potential. It is not just a fairytale, but a legitimate question:
what if the said information capabilities are indeed enhanced? We shall see the answers are far
from being evident and they would stimulate tantalizing discussions. Any enhancement will lead
to evolutionary changes; we shall argue that economic evolution can be inﬂuenced willingly to
some extent by proactively designing appropriate institutions. This logically will pose questions
for economic evolution, i.e. what are the consequences of such changes, both desirable and unex-
pectedly non-desirable, in the face of our limited information and judging power. Being aware of
such questions and studying their origins can help ﬁnding ways to improve it. Any improvement
will upset the status quo and it will impact the evolutionary path of the economy.
3. From Natural Selection to Informational Selection
Natural selection is recognized to be the key mechanism driving evolution in the world of bi-
ology. Its success inspired many to consider similar mechanisms in social, economic processes.
Over the past century numerous renowned economists have forcefully argued that economics
must be fashioned into an evolutionary theory (Marshall, Veblen, Schumpeter et al). There is a
recent surge in the literature of evolutionary economics, in which many similarities and diﬀer-
ences are being hotly debated. I shall try to distinguish biology and economy by their diﬀerent
selection mechanisms. In the world of biology, even including the primitive economy, the dom-
inant selection mechanism is natural. On the contrary in the complex, post-industrial economy,
selection is more often among human agents themselves and subject to many visible and invis-
ible institutional settings. Whereas in Nature creatures must fend for themselves and their kin,
economic agents rarely rely exclusively on their own cognitive and information capabilities only.
I shall argue in the sequel that such a selection mechanism is weaker in strength but superior in
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form than natural selection. To highlight the man-made nature and the diﬀerence from natural
selection, let us call the mechanism as ’informational selection’.
The need of selection. What is in common of the two theories is they all have selection as
key mechanism. That selection plays an important role in cultural, economic processes is not
yet a generally accepted fact. Thanks to the foresight and intentionality of human agents, some
argue that social, economic evolution is more of Lamarckian than Darwinian. Indeed human
agents can avoid considerable trial-and-error costs, thus the outcome may seem to be the fruits
of human planning. However, if one looks closer the events between the initial planning and
the ﬁnal outcome, there are many triﬂing, detailed alternatives that human agents must make
a choice. Their choice for one rather another often is based on ’hunches’, not on mechanic
schemes. The economy can be considered as a food web patched together by many pieces. At
each node of this web, the joint is less rigid than mechanic; there are fortuitous elements depend
on human actors’ information capabilities, complex motives, incentives, institutional settings,
and judgmental power. Francis Bacon (1620), considered by many as the founder of modern
science, cautioned us long ago that ’The human understanding is of its own nature prone to
suppose the existence of more order and regularity in the world than it ﬁnds’. His advice rings
especially true when our subject of study is no longer physical systems, rather human cultural
and economic processes.
Complexity of the economy. Many economists compare complex tasks to a chess game; for
example Paul Ormerod [31] in his latest book ”Why Most Things Fail” discussed extensively the
analogy between chess-playing and economic decision-making. Though a chess player is well
exercised in foresight, but he cannot see beyond a few steps. If chess is complex enough, think of
the economy: the rules of game are much less ﬁxed and honest, and the relevant parameters are
far more numerous. Brian Arthur [4] argues forcefully for ’The End of Certainty in Economics’;
he pointed out that economic issues are so complex, decision-making must take into account of
inevitable uncertainty. We shall argue throughout this paper that selection plays an important
role, mainly beyond the human foresight range.
We must acknowledge that informational selection is not exclusively for social, economic
processes: it also plays an important role in biology. In was Darwin who ﬁrst proposed it,
though under a diﬀerent name. Besides the natural selection principle, he has also postulated
the sexual selection principle. Many of his contemporaries did not grasp why he made the two
as separate theories. They have tried to incorporate sexual selection into the natural selection
theory, in vain [8]. Sexual reproduction now is recognized as a superior alternative to asexual
reproduction, despite apparent huge costs [23]. Biologists recognize that there are multiple ad-
vantages that sexual reproduction can confer, over asexual reproduction. Though there is not yet
the ﬁnal word on what are the dominant advantages to oﬀset the apparent costs, most scholars
concur that sexual reproduction dominates over asexual selection. Sexual reproduction heralded
a new era in the evolutionary history and it is unthinkable that higher organisms can strive as
they do today without it. Sexual reproduction normally requires both male and female to join in
a mutually beneﬁcial transaction. It poses an informational challenge when an animal needs to
select a reproduction partner among many rivals. Dawkins in ”selﬁsh gene” [11] vividly high-
lights the imperfect information problem and creatures’ ingenious ways to cope with it. He
maintains that wherever there is need of communication, cheating, exploiting, and anti-cheating
warfare should be expected. In sexual reproduction usually males go to a considerable length
to signal their quality, this leads to such costly ornamental organs like peacock’s tail and now
extinguished Irish elk’s huge antlers. Sexual reproduction represents a higher form of economy
of Nature, compared to asexual reproduction of doing-it-alone. Paradoxically this higher form is
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also weaker in strength (it suﬀers the imperfect information problem); however it beneﬁts from
the ’institutional advantages’ that sexual reproduction can confer. We see that sexual reproduc-
tion can be interpreted as a special example of informational selection. Darwin already put down
the seed for the theory. The modern economy though being purposeful and much more complex,
it can be regarded as still higher forms of economy.
The modern economy is of higher forms. Despite the mantra of ’laissez-faire’ the capitalist
economy can strive thanks to myriad of institutions fostering and regulating the market mech-
anism. No agent is disconnected from others: rarely two agents deal with one another in the
absence of others and without an institutional setting facilitating and obliging them. The current
economy is no longer the world of Robinson Crusoe doing-it-alone (he would face predomi-
nantly natural selection), nor the primitive economy where [7] ’two individuals exchanging nuts
for berries on the edge of the forest’. Our economy is sustained by an intertwined, complex
information food web; most of the agents are at some intermediate nodes, subject more likely
to informational selection pressure from our rivals, partners, counterparts, than from natural el-
ements alone. Take a public company for example: it takes in investment capitals, churns out
products. Its composition and daily business life exposes it to all kinds of informational selection
pressure. It is only a fairytale that what counts for the ﬁrm is to produce best products that con-
sumers crave and for each reporting season to show fantastic growth and proﬁt numbers. Perusal
of the business press we see many examples that better products do not necessarily make them
a success; many information gambits must be played for a ﬁrm to struggle ahead from its rivals.
In spite of heavy monetary incentives, the company is not always able to choose the best candi-
date as its CEO. On the selection side the board itself maybe crooked and/or incompetent; the
candidate’s chance to win depends more on his signaling skills than his real substance to lead.
The reported fantastic numbers can be more or less brilliantly manipulated, information for the
investing public is far from being easy to verify. It is not hard to see evidence abound that on
virtually each business interacting node, information comes short of what it could be. Yet the
modern capitalist economy strives in the face of unending stories of nasty abuses. The complex
institutional institutions come with many loopholes, yet higher forms of economy have evolved
with the concomitant institutions. The simplest form of economy is rarely corrupted. The cap-
italist economy did not collapse as predicted long ago thanks to various evolved institutions,
despite all the shortcomings.
Darwin [9] in ”The Origin of Species” highlights how natural selection is vastly more pow-
erful than breeders’ eﬀorts of selecting a few intended traits. Whereas ’natural selection is daily
and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, the slightest variations; rejecting those that are
bad, preserving and adding up all that are good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and
wherever opportunity oﬀers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic
and inorganic conditions of life.’ Informational selection involves mostly man’s conscious eﬀort
that are sometimes on, sometimes oﬀ; and human fallibility makes the strength of informational
selection far more feeble than the ’incessant and unerring power’ of natural selection. Milton
Friedman [14], while recognizing that individual agents face much uncertainty, but he expressed
the unfailing faith in the outcome, ’as if’ the agents were able to maximize their beneﬁt. The ’as
if’ assertion has been considered by many economists to be similar to the methodology of Dr.
Pangloss (e.g. [19], [31]. To examine whether or not economic agents can achieve the optimal
beneﬁt one must compare diﬀerent-current as well as realizable- institutional settings, to see if
some alternatives are better at enabling the agents to enhance their information capabilities and
what are the consequences. In informational selection agents’ selection capabilities depend on
theirs own as well as implicitly on others. This is diﬀerent from the world of biology where in the
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prey-predator relations, sexual selection animals rely mainly on their own, and no purposeful or-
ganization (though to some degree via group selection). Higher forms of economy is represented
by complex organizations. Firms are also a kind of institutions, and Ronald Coase pioneered in
analyzing the advantages as well as the transaction diﬃculties. Here I shall concentrate on the
information institutions. Three parties: the buyers, the vendors, and the information mediating
institution between them form a typical business relation. This is diﬀerent from the traditional
group selection approach as each party is still mostly proﬁt motivated, with perhaps only a small
altruistic element among the consumers taking part in evaluation and feedback. The enabling
role by information institutions is crucial, but they can reap a part of the beneﬁt indirectly from
successful transactions.
Let us summarize the main diﬀerence between informational selection for economic pro-
cesses and natural selection for the world of biology. Due to the pervasive problem of imperfect
information, the selection strength by information selection normally is weaker than that of nat-
ural selection. However, thanks to the institutional advantages of higher forms of economy, not
only the weakness can be oﬀset, but also the overall beneﬁts can be signiﬁcant. Moreover, infor-
mational selection can be improved by carefully designing information institutions and this type
of improvement can continue, leading to endless evolution.
4. Information Institutions as Matchmaker
In the modern economy, economic agents rarely rely exclusively on their own cognitive ca-
pabilities to obtain necessary information for decisions. They beneﬁt from fellow agents directly
and most often, indirectly. Such information can also come from organizations that collect it on
agents’ behalf. Two modes of boosting information capabilities: experts as information inter-
mediaries versus fellow agents indirectly helping each other. I shall argue in this paper that the
second mode grows in importance and will be the dominant one.
There are many information institutions, public or private, free service or for-proﬁt organiza-
tions, that help consumers to overcome the asymmetrical information handicap. The advantage is
straightforward: since a centralized expertise system is best poised to reap beneﬁts of economies
of scale, such a system can do much more thorough research about products than any individual
consumer can. Such a service should be easily compensated for its eﬀort since small individual
contributions can amount to a considerable sum. However, there are some intrinsic problems this
business model suﬀers: how can one be sure that the experts do not collude with the vendors; how
are experts themselves are selected and how can generic research meet individual consumers’ id-
iosyncratic needs? There are some academic criticism [12] exposing the weakness.
Another business model is emerging: a new breed of information institutions, which in gen-
eral established by entrepreneurs on the World Wide Web, enables consumers to help each other.
Individuals may have access to some local, speciﬁc information which is hard to ﬁnd even for
experts. If these bits and pieces can be collected then the consuming public in the aggregate can
improve upon deﬁcient information capabilities. The general role played by all the information
institutions can be said to be matchmaking between consumers and vendors. When a transaction
happens, it is not hard to identify such matchmakers lurking in the background.
Informational Division of Labor. Why economic agents in their enlightened pursuit of their
own beneﬁt, cannot rely on themselves to cope with the information problem such as Adam
Smith posited? Why do information institutions play an important role which cannot be done
otherwise? The eﬀects of division of labor were dramatically highlighted in ”The Wealth of Na-
tions” (Smith 1776) through the example of a pin-factory-productivity increasing by many orders
1946 Y.-C. Zhang / Physics Procedia 3 (2010) 1941–1955
/ Physics Procedia 00 (2010) 1–15 7
of magnitude. Due to the non-rival nature of information and the sheer global scale, potential
beneﬁt from fully exploiting informational division of labor can be no less spectacular. Most of
informational tasks faced by a consumer are repetitive: many consumers before her had faced
the similar problem of information asymmetry handicap on the same product. Consumers how-
ever are not homogenous, each may happen to know some niches better than others. Hayek [16]
presciently emphasized the role played by such local information. Division of labor can bring
important rationalization of individual eﬀorts by grouping the disconnected bits and pieces to-
gether; the saving in eﬀort can allow in depth search for information by better placed consumers,
to redress the information asymmetry. These bits and pieces are not simply to add up, as one
needs also reliable evaluation; a certain amount of redundancy must be present. How to make
sense of vast amount of noisy, often contradictory, and redundant information online presents the
key challenge for the current and future sophisticated information institutions. This is also the
subject of current mathematical modeling [24].
Traditional information institutions patronize their member clients by doing the search of de-
sired information on their behalf. The examples are Better Business Bureau, Consumer Reports,
and Zagat Restaurant Guides (mainly for New York but also some coverage of the US). Some
experts achieve super star status. ’The former food critic of New York Times Ruth Reichl, who
used to check out many restaurants incognito, then to write her evaluation on the popular cafes
and restaurants. With a huge readership behind, her opinions can make or break any establish-
ment. However, no matter how able she is, as a single individual inherently she is limited by her
own biases, capabilities and other whims. The role of information matchmakers can be greatly
enhanced if every consumer can act like a food inspector and their reports are captured and ap-
propriately interpreted. In this sense that information institutions renounces to play the role of
experts themselves, but as organizers and enablers. Admittedly, not every restaurant diner is as
perceptive and good as Reichl, but the entire mass is much stronger than any genius.
In the knowledge space this already takes place. Wikipedia in a few years has built up over
a million articles on whatever subject the users care to write and to know. It bills itself as ’the
encyclopedia’ by people and for people. It now carries more articles than all other encyclopedia
combined, oﬄine and online, including the venerable Britannica Encyclopedia. Though the qual-
ity still suﬀers reliability problem or the perception thereof, especially in the eyes of accredited
experts, Wikipedia improves rapidly both in quality and breadth.
Division of labor goes beyond the consumer sector; let us cite some examples inside busi-
ness organizations. More and more ﬁrms set up information systems to allow their employees to
share knowledge, and to direct questions to the most suitable personnel, using the ’collaborative
ﬁltering’ technology. Some ﬁrms create ’prediction markets’, for instance Hewlett Packard using
the design by the economists at Caltech (2002), to let the ﬁrm’s rank and ﬁle to predict sale num-
bers and likely success among new products. NASA’s clickworkers lets enthusiastic amateurs to
participate in a large project. Ely Lilly set up an online talent-outsourcing site [21]. It seems that
informational division of labor is just at its humble onset, not yet rivals the traditional way of
doing business.
Design and foresight. In the evolutionary economics literature we often ﬁnd arguments in
favor of Lamarckism over Darwinism (e.g. [30]). However I shall argue below that despite of
human intentionality Darwinian selection is still at work, albeit on another level. Informational
selection falls in line within broad Darwinian reasoning. Thanks to human foresight, informa-
tional selection, though weaker in strength compared with natural selection, has longer ranges.
And the ranges can be considerably extended by adequate institutional arrangement.
For economic agents, entrepreneur-designers, and scholars the foresight is necessarily lim-
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ited. For example a good chess player can at best foresee a few steps ahead; being a bit better
than his rival will make the diﬀerence. Beyond the limited foreseeable range lies vast unknown
realm. On the longer time scales human society in general and the economy in particular, at best
can be regarded as probing forward in darkness. The modest foresight ranges allow us neverthe-
less to avoid tremendous amount of costly errors, but still much more remains beyond our grasp.
Therefore viewing from the longer time scales informational selection is much similar to natural
selection. Yet it comes with two main particularities: it is weaker in strength as discussed above,
but its institutional advantages allow us to skip many costly trial-errors. A complex economy
is more vulnerable to corruption, abuses, but in general it can still be better than the primitive
economy. Dawkins in ”Blind Watchmaker” [10] has a nice way to make a similar point. Bat and
radar both use eco-location mechanism for detection; though radar is far from being as perfect
as the bat, but its scope and range can be vastly superior in many other aspects. Karl Marx [29]
maintained that the worst architect can be still better than the best of bees; for human intentional
planning can be much superior.
Whereas foresight and intentionality are limited for individual agents, this handicap can be
compensated by foresight on a higher level-institution designing. Again, this higher level nec-
essarily is also limited. Consider the following metaphorical car-driver versus car-designer and
traﬃc-planner. The car driver must face every hazard while driving; despite of his skills he may
still cause accidents and come short of the safety and performance goals. The car designer and
traﬃc planner operate on a higher level with similar goals; however their ways of achieving these
goals are diﬀerent from that of the car driver. They would carefully observe the aggregate behav-
ior of drivers and come up with designs to allow the driver better chances to achieve his goals.
Though eﬀorts by the car designer and traﬃc planner on the higher level remain imperfect and
cannot prevent the driver from making a particular accident; their foresight can go a long way to
help the driver’s long term goals.
Institutions, especially information institutions play a pivotal role in the current and future
economy. How do they come into being is still in much debate. Veblen, in Instinct [37] consid-
ered institutions as lagging behind of economic development. When need be, social, economic
forces will re-adjust themselves for the new reality by aligning society’s institutions up to date.
Many economists [19] have considered downward and upward causation. Recognizing the pos-
sibility that not only institutions can be adapting and lagging, passively respond to changes; it
may take the lead role to go one step ahead, downward causing or enabling economic processes.
Technology and entrepreneurship play mutually stimulating role, sometime one is ahead and
boosts another, other times the opposite [13].
It should be noted that intentionality can operate on an higher level, downward-causing by
institution-designing. The emergence of information institutions is not always the consequence
of urgent need, but entrepreneurs’ anticipation of future needs. People were not clamoring for
badly needed auction sites that Ebay.com, nor eager readers could not buy enough books that
Amazon.com, come into being. These information institutions anticipate future opportunities
that users themselves have not yet manifested explicitly. But based on strategic thinking coupled
with the IT progress, the designers exercised their foresight to plan ahead. Clearly these design-
ers did not follow the ’laissez-faire’ doctrine; if they were helped by economists and scientists
their endeavor may even go farther and do better. Probably they themselves were surprised at the
extent of their successes, but they must have ﬁgured out about people’s need to some extent, at
least more than their rivals. Information institution-designing is a risky business: if the anticipa-
tion did not materialize, it can lead to spectacular failures. In the heyday of the dot.com craze, it
seemed anything can go. Investors poured in money with abandon; countless internet companies
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went bankrupt. This attests that informational selection is not only weak but also highly ﬂuctuat-
ing, swinging sometimes from highly permissive to highly severe; but in the long run it may get
the selection job done.
5. Diversity versus Eﬃciency
The next natural question is what are the consequences of enhanced informational selection
capabilities? To a lesser extent, even without any technology progress and institutional changes,
cognitive capabilities change and so are consumer tastes and products. After all even in the most
stagnant period of technology progress, due to human learning curves-new things become fa-
miliar, the barely known becomes known-one can speak of information capability enhancement.
What are the consequences of enhanced capabilities, making perfect the tasks we face or open-
ing new frontiers? To better appreciate this question it helps to reexamine what is amiss prior to
information enhancement. At any given point in economic evolution information is imperfect,
but only to a limited extent. This is so because that only confronted with current problems we
ﬁnd information lacking; tasks which are hopelessly beyond the current information capabilities
would not even be considered. Under imperfect information innovative, personalized and niche
products are not yet viable. Between the currently viable products and production possibilities
that are not yet viable, there must be a continuum. Should information capabilities be enhanced
a little, some novelties become viable whereas some old products exit [39]. It is likely that en-
hanced information capabilities would in part redress the information asymmetry imbalance on
the current products, tasks etc; and in part activate the previously not viable new niches that re-
quiring a better information environment. If man has only ﬁxed wants, no matter how complex
is an economy one day evolution would come to a stop: having solved all the problems. We shall
see there emerges a new ’allocation-creation’ paradigm which is diﬀerent from the ’allocation’
paradigm. Economic evolution in general, informational selection capabilities in particular, will
probably improve on solving the current problems, and will also activate new economic possibil-
ities that were previously either not thought of or not viable. Pursuit of improving on the current
problem solving faces diminishing returns; whereas opening new frontiers reinforces itself. Most
importantly these new frontiers are not completely random events (though unforeseen elements
must also be present); to a certain degree they are of our own making and man can impact the
evolutionary path to some important degree.
With the advent of the internet, fast economic evolution has been keenly followed. Chris An-
derson [2] has reported on the ’Long Tail’ phenomenon, which has ignited much debate among
online forums. The basic idea is that many niche products (books, songs, etc), previously ei-
ther neglected or not viable now play an ever more important role. The term ’long tail’ comes
from the fact that on the rank-list of a given type of products, say books, besides a few bestsellers
there are many infrequent items that traditional business could not do much to reap beneﬁt. Many
commentators have noted how the powerful information technology is dramatically changing the
balance between the ’hit’ and ’non-hit’ items.
Novelties do not just rain randomly on us. Instead of passively waiting for them, we can
inﬂuence somewhat the novelty ﬂow and be better prepared to cope with them once they appear.
There is a large amount of economics literature in which novelties appear endogenously. Ulrich
Witt [38] studied the relationship between novelty genesis and its evaluation, where he compares
mental selection (evaluation) versus natural selection on novelties. The mental selection proposal
anticipates the above informational selection idea. Lamarckian determinism should be however
excluded, since intentionality can only achieve relatively results. It is primordial to try our best
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to take the soon-to-come novelties into account in our current aﬀairs. Entrepreneurs know it best:
though human intended endeavors are humble, prone to errors, those who anticipate better and
with least errors will prevail. However as Witt [38] point out, novelties often carry undesirable
features impossible to foresee.
Humans are intrinsically inhomogeneous in tastes and traits; therefore the need for diversity
is always there but can remain dormant for lack of information capabilities. The reality of cheap,
mass production can be in part attributed to the information asymmetry between the supply and
demand sides. Whereas the supply side seeks to enhance productivity (eﬃciency); the desire of
the demand side is more complex. Consumers can also beneﬁt from eﬃciency, but they would
like to have diversity as well. Between the two diversity is the most vulnerable part: suﬃcient
information capabilities for search, evaluation are necessary to sustain it. Many people argue
that the current globalization pace makes the information asymmetry even more accentuated:
Wal-Mart and other multi-national chains accelerate the global consolidation trend. The supply
side sees its members dramatically reduced to a few giants, who enjoys great leverage with their
suppliers in getting extremely price competitive products. The supply side is not insensitive to
the diversiﬁcation needs of the consuming public. Business consultants exhort their clients with
call ’diversify or die!’. There is a dilemma for ﬁrms: consumers have diversiﬁcation needs, but
these depend on their information capabilities. Firms do not have much choices if the latter
remains insuﬃcient; their business imperatives oblige them to provide simple, cheap, mass prod-
ucts commensurate with consumers discerning capabilities. Thus diversiﬁcation’s driving force
comes from consumers and a business may proactively anticipate their needs. Though Wal-Mart
and the like would also take some eﬀort to make their oﬀering with some diversity, but it is
doubtful that they care the fundamental, long term welfare of consumers adequately. Competing
in the global retail space is a matter of life and death. Given the current level of the consum-
ing public’s information capabilities still being mediocre and information asymmetry increasing,
the giants have no choice but to oﬀer ever cheaper, simpler, globally-sourced uniform products.
However this trend can be stopped, if not rolled back when consumers’ information capabilities
are boosted through new information institutions. Futurist Toﬄer in Third Wave portrayed the
two tendencies, eﬃciency versus diversity, as two opposing waves. The pursuit of eﬃciency is
one wave, started from the industrial revolution; diversiﬁcation is another wave which bas been
retreating ever since. However the diversiﬁcation wave has shown signs of vigor of late as we
enter the so-called information age; there are hope that a better balance can be achieved between
these two ’waves’.
The tendency to diversify-if informational selection being enhanced- makes a close analogy
with Darwinian evolution. The allocation paradigm in neoclassical economics is not compatible
with Darwinian thinking: since there is a perfect benchmark in equilibrium economics, any
evolution would come to a stop; dynamic processes would be reduced to mere ﬂuctuations around
a pre-established benchmark, without true novelty to replenish the economy. The ’allocation-
creation’ paradigm posits however, the informational selection pressure to a large extent can be
enhanced, and it can creates always new frontiers while solving somewhat better the current
problems. The process continues without any apparent end in sight. There is neither optimum
nor benchmark as goal, despite the eﬀorts of economic agents. The key diﬀerence between the
allocation and allocation-creation paradigms lies in how each treats novelties. If the economic
agents possess unlimited information capabilities and can instantly optimize whatever they need
do; novelties rain down randomly and the agents instantly optimally readjust themselves, then the
allocation paradigm prevails, apart from the annoyance that the perfect equilibrium is disturbed
from time to time. If, on the other hand, the agents are limited in all the senses for complex tasks,
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and their striving is hampered by inadequate institutions which require a long time to adapt and
change, such that the agents cannot optimally solve their current problems; moreover, in their
striving they would generate or help generating novelties (plus the random events), then they
must take on two fronts: current problem-solving as well as novelty-creating.
Neoclassical economics posits that any proﬁtable margin will attract so many competitors
that eventually the zero-margin-limit prevails. This is just another consequence from the ’alloca-
tion’ paradigm. According to the new ’allocation-creation’ paradigm however, there are always
some ﬁrms who happen to get temporary advantages over others. They try to break away from
the competition to be diﬀerent, to hold some temporary monopoly, and to diversify. Of course
there are also many other entrepreneurs not having better innovative ideas and less capable to
create their own niche (can still be successful), will try to enter the currently lucrative markets
that others pioneered. In fact we have an economy that both running-away and running-towards
the current popular production possibilities coexist. Most entrepreneurs can be both at diﬀerent
times, the key decisive factor is whether they have (slightly) better viable innovative possibili-
ties or not. Those breaking into new grounds replenish the economy with innovations whereas
whose who follow and compete on the current niches contribute to the productivity and eﬃ-
ciency. Our economy did not end up in boring zero-margin state thanks chieﬂy to the constant
striving to break out and to diversify. Successful innovations in turn reward the entrepreneurs as
well as reinvigorate the economy. However, we cannot isolate the supply side without at the same
time consider consumers’ informational selection capabilities. How willing and easy for those
entrepreneurs to break out into innovative, ﬁner niches depends crucially on information capabil-
ities of the consumers. The higher are such capabilities, the easier it is for the quality goods to be
recognized and appreciated, and more willing are entrepreneurs to manifest their innovative po-
tential. We see the virtuous cycle can begin when the information institutions manage to enable
consumers to enhance their information capabilities, the consequences are indeed far-reaching.
Entrepreneurs pay scant attention to the ’allocation’ paradigm. Instead of maximizing proﬁt for
whatever their current business, they channel a signiﬁcant fraction of their scarce resources into
research and development in search of novelties, but without the certainty that fruits would bear
out.
With the advent of the internet there is a general trend of increasing information capabilities
for consumers. One speaks of leveling the playground between consumers and vendors. Those
entrepreneurs who anticipate this trend, or alert enough to catch this trend when the ﬁrst signs
emerge, are best poised to reap beneﬁts; those who are slow to realize that such a trend’s coming
will have to be on the defensive of the old way of doing business.
Products come in many categories, one category deserves special attention: agriculture and
food. We shall see that diversiﬁcation is particularly desirably in this category since economic
diversiﬁcation has direct impact on biologic diversiﬁcation; the two types of evolution cross paths
in this category. Ultimately consumers’ well-being depends on informational selection’s fate.
Natural selection over millions of years, agricultural selection over the past 10000 years, have
created a great many species and only a small part ﬁnds use and value in our current economy.
6. Methodology
We have outlined the basic mechanism of informational selection. It is instructive to note
that whenever there is selection, there are two sides-the selector and the selected. For mutually
selecting case, like that between a buyer and a vendor, there are two selections: the buyer acts as
selector for the vendor’s products, and the vendor acts as selector for buyer’s suitability. The most
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important diﬀerence respect to natural selection should be noted: whereas in natural selection
Nature acts as a unfailing selector, ’daily and hourly’ scrutinizing the world of biology and we
have total trust in her selection power; for informational selection it is utmost important to boost
the selector’s side. Informational selector is though imperfect, it can be improved thanks to
its higher level, institutional advantages. The improvement can be done not necessarily on the
individual level, but by studying and designing (by the entrepreneurs as well as scholars and
policy makers) appropriate information institutions to empower and enable the division of labor
of myriad of individuals, such that connected individuals can much better cope with the perennial
information asymmetry.
Economic evolution driven by informational selection leads to important methodological
shifts as well. Mainstream economics inﬁltrates some leading work in evolutionary economics.
In the Nelson-Winter [30] book the authors posit that a ﬁrm will choose this and that variant to
maximize its proﬁt goal. In their simulation model they explicitly model the ﬁrm’s choices. In a
recently work Lerner and Tirole [25] proposes a new utility function for voluntary participation
in open-source projects. They added a speciﬁc term valuing agents’ psychological beneﬁt for
participation in voluntary work. In the more traditional literature we have many examples from
Gary Becker [5], Accounting for Tastes, who would prescribe a special utility function almost
for everything in human life: church-going, spouse-choosing, child-bearing, etc. Indeed with
this approach anything can be a posteriori accounted for. But such approach may degenerate into
non-falsiﬁable sciences. We often see the following research agenda: the scholars perceptively
observe economic agents, after a good number of years they may ﬁnally conﬁrm an established
pattern and write down, conform to neoclassical tradition, a utility function to account for the ob-
served facts. This is self-defeating since the scholars will inevitably lag behind the practitioners.
At the best they can only capture a tiny fraction of all the traits economic agents tend to manifest,
usually the most obvious ones. This is not consistent to Darwinian thinking.
The methodology adopted by Darwin would not propose which mutations will come out nor
impute a meaning to this and that variant. Mutations and variants play a very important role
and the Darwinian scholars are especially keen in observing them. However, they would refrain
to give much meaning to individual mutations. The selected side provides raw material in the
form of mutations and variants. The Darwinian scholars though must be very attentive to these
variations, but they would keep a respectful distance. In economic processes some scholars
tend to identify causality relation in a chain of events, implicitly imitating their colleagues in
’hard’ sciences. There is a danger speciﬁc to social-economic processes: what appears to be an
inevitable chain of events, if examined closely, we shall see often informational selection played a
decisive role in choosing one out many contingents. If we neglect selection we may get erroneous
conclusion that a causality relationship obtains. There is much debate among economists whether
evolution is of Lamarckian or Darwinian [20]. Darwinian thinking highlights the role played by
selection and refrain from deducting causality relations.
The subtle point to distinguish the diﬀerence between the selector and the selected can be
easily illustrated by a metaphorical chess game. An experienced chess player would be very
watchful of his opponent moves; in fact he may have many hypotheses about his opponent’s
next move and prepare many contingencies accordingly. One thing he would not do is to assume
his opponent’s most likely next move to be the answer; and so doing would put himself in the
opponent’s place. To assume too much of his opponent next move is like to play the chess game
himself on both sides; and it is easy to understand, self-playing on both sides would trivialize the
game. Scholars keen in studying economic agents and their decision making, would be advised
to keep a similar respectful distance from the agent’s decision details and motives, some are
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ultimately unknowable. Mechanically modeling the selected side is like playing the chess game
on both sides, and the game risks to degenerate to triviality. On the other hand on the selector
side the stake is high and scholars can make a big diﬀerence. If rules of game can be better
designed, there is improved chance to reward good variations and discourage bad variations in
economic agents’ behavior. We should pay special attention to the cause-eﬀect relation between
the rule-changing on the selector side, and the responses from the selected side. This allows
improving upon our assumptions about aggregate tendencies on the selected side. Some traits
are more easily activated than others; designers’ role is to test hypothesis, in the real world.
There will be better and worse hypothesis which have diﬀerent chances of success. In fact we
must face a higher level of selection on the institutional forms. Higher form of selection on the
level of information institutions is probably also weak in strength; nevertheless the stake is high
and potential is huge, and even imperfect selection is still far better than doing nothing at all. In
short the informational selection methodology renounces to capture one by one the individual
traits and variations, which are raw material for selection, but puts emphasis on how best to treat
them selectively in the aggregate. A chain of events in cultural, economic processes has more to
do with selection at each node than any apparent causality relation.
The future study of informational selection would greatly beneﬁt from a unprecedented level
of multi-disciplinarity. This methodological feature may become the most visible element in the
endeavor of the research economic evolution. We shall need expertise from many disciplines,
some obvious, others less. Economics, biology, evolutionary history will play the leading role.
Information technology must also be involved if the accelerated pace of economic evolution is to
be understood, beneﬁts reaped, and risks forewarned. Psychology is next-many economists have
already pioneered in this discipline such as Veblen and Scitovsky. Law, economics and tech-
nology have recently joined force to make powerful tools to face current economic and social
challenges, for prominent examples see [26, 27] and [6]. Within the broad economics disci-
pline the branch of institutionalism may get reinvigorated when it is coupled with the branch of
evolutionary economics; there is a strong link between them if informational selection is taken
seriously. In fact it will be unavoidable for evolutionary economists to reconsider the role of in-
stitutions, especially information institutions in their old forms as well as the wide spread hi-tech
forms. Last but not the least, natural sciences like mathematics and physics can also play their
part; as the current discipline of complexity can shed light on many issues from the economy
which require often in depth technical analysis. Methods developed in the physics of the 19th
century, which is dominated by Descartesian thinking, will gradually cede the way to methods
from Darwinian thinking. Indeed pursuing further the study of information selection we may feel
as if we are continuing Darwin’s methodology, though not imitating what literally has been done.
In fact, though informational selection concerns a quite diﬀerent area-economy, yet it turns out
to be surprisingly similar in spirit and in methodology with the evolutionary thinking pioneered
by the grand master, Charles Darwin.
7. Toward A New Paradigm
Many economists have recently studied similar issues related to imperfect information, and
in many aspects they have anticipated the informational selection theory outlined above. In-
deed Stiglitz [34] called for paradigm shift in economics research. His work touches upon many
branches of economics and he believes that it can challenge systematically neoclassical eco-
nomics. However, Stiglitz remains ambiguous about the foundation of the ’allocation’ paradigm,
giving the impression that neoclassical economics can be repaired and reconciled with the ’new
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paradigm’. Meir Kohn [22] ’exchange and value’ is probably the most explicit work in com-
paring the old and new paradigms; he pointed out that it is fundamentally impossible to have a
hybrid system to accommodate the two. My own outline above is closely related to his proposal.
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath [17] explained ’why there is no such thing like transaction costs’, de-
bunking the non-falsiﬁable equilibrium notion once transaction costs are invoked, and implying
for an open-end evolution. His recent book [18] ”Grundriss der Evolutions?konomik” presents
a more ambitious and wide-sweeping theoretical framework on the role played by information
and knowledge in evolution; among other things it contains and anticipates many points raised in
this paper, especially his ’variation, selection, and preservation’ paradigm (das VSB-Paradigma)
for cultural, economic processes implies informational selection. Bertin Martens [28] empha-
sized also the link between imperfect cognitive capabilities and evolution. Several authors have
highlighted the diﬀerence of selection in the economy and the world of biology, for example
Ulrich Witt [38] emphasized mental evaluation and novelty-generation, and he anticipated this
writer on the ’allocation-creation’ paradigm by advocating an ’adequate balance between prob-
lem solving and problem generating’; Geoﬀ Hodgson [20], Viktor Vanberg [36], and Whitman
(2001) are among strong proponents of the view that Darwinian selection can be compatible
with human foresight and planning. Gilles Paquet in ’Evolutionary Cognitive Economics’ [32]
pointed out that economic agents purposely create institutions with foresight, even though their
cognitive capabilities are imperfect. Paul Ormerod’s recent book [31] ”Why Most Things Fail”,
presented many business cases to show diﬀerences and similarities in selection and extinction
for the economy and biological world. In the second half of the last century, there are many
authors who have anticipated this writer one way or another. The above is but a tiny fraction of
the literature in evolutionary economics. On the other hand, it is hard to say that a consensus has
already emerged. This observation is based on the fact that the above authors rarely cite each
other, diﬀerent terminology poses also a barrier to compare them. However, the above selective
references have one thing in common: all are from this new century-attesting the latest surge in
interest in evolutionary issues as well as the sign that a new paradigm may ﬁnally dethrone the
reign of neoclassical economics.
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